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HAS A LANDOWNER ANY PROPERTY IN OIL AND GAS
IN PLACE?

By
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SIMONTON.*

Centuries ago Coke wrote the following: "And lastly, the earth
hath a great extent upwards, not only of water, as hath been said,
but of ayre and all other things even up to heaven; for cujus est
solurn, ejus est usque ad coelum. . ."' Probably Coke believed,
and it was thereafter assumed, that the land owner, owned to the
heavens and to the center of the earth, and it was probably assumed
that he necessarily owned whatever happened to be included within
this space. Courts have since been struggling to make cases fit
this rigid understanding of the law and when they have departed
from it, the departure has generally been with reluctance. By the
time of Blackstone it certainly had become established that the
landowner did not own all things included in the space above his
land though it was taken for granted that he did own the
space itself.2 For example, he did not own the waters flowing over his land, nor the air above his land, nor the fish
in such waters, nor the wild animals on his land.3 He was
considered as owning the space above his land, but not as
owning absolutely the more or less fugitive things which might
happen to be found within such space, for the reason that.
P rofessor of Law, West Virginia University.
CoxE ON LsrT., 4a.
2 BLACK. Comm., 18, 19.
S 2 BLAcK. Comm., 394, 400-4.
2
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it was probably found to be impossible to apply the ordinary
rules of absolute ownership to things which had the power of departing from the land without the owner's volition.4 It was difficult to conceive of a thing, uncontrolled by any owner, in which the
property changed from one man to another every time an artificial boundary was crossed. However, it was probably assumed
that the landowner did own absolutely everything beneath the surface, though no cases involving fugitive things beneath the surface of the earth had yet arisen, nor did any such cases arise for
centuries thereafter. When cases involving rights in percolating
waters did arise the courts applied at first the theory that the landowner owned everything to the center of the earth, as had been
stated by Coke, and many of them have not yet departed from this
ancient misconception in respect to fugitive things beneath the surface. The courts thus disregarded the fact that such water belonged with those things which Blackstone said must "unavoidably
remain in common."5 Perhaps one reason for this is that if things
pass beneath the surface from the land of A to the land of B and
are appropriated there by B, A can not prove that they were in
fact his property, as he might be able to do in the case of flowing
water, or wild animals, or air. Consequently cases have not arisen
in which this rule clearly can not be followed without manifest injustice and absurdity. But such cases would certainly arise in regard to flowing water, or air, or wild animals above .the surface if
the absolute ownership of these things were held to be in the land.
owner.
As to these things of a fugitive nature found in the space above
the surface of the land, Blackstone says:
"A man may lastly have a qualified property in animals
ferae naturae propter privilegium, that is, he may have the
privilege of hunting, taking and killing them in exclusion of
other persons. Here he has a transient property in these animals usually called game so long as they continue within his
liberty, and may restrain any stranger from taking them
therein; but the instant they depart into another liberty, this
qualified property ceases .....
.A man can have no absolute
, "But after all, there are some few things, which, notwithstanding the general
introduction and continuance of property, must still unavoidably remain in common; being such wherein nothing but an usufructuary property is capable of being
had; and, therefore, they still belong to the firstoccupant, during the time he
holds possession of them, and no longer. Such (among others) are ihe elements
of light, air and water;" 1 BLACK. Com., 14.
5 See note 4, supra.
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permanent property in these, as he may in the earth and land;
since these are of a vague and fugitive nature and therefore
can admit only of a precarious and qualified ownership, which
lasts so long as they are in actual use and occupation and no.
longer ......
"Many other things may also be objects of qualified property. It may subsist in the very elements, of fire or light, of.
air, and of water. A man can have no absolute permanent property in these, as he may in the earth and land; since these areof a vague and fugitive nature, and therefore can admit onlyof a precarious and qualified ownership, which lasts so long as:
they are in the actual use and occupation, but no longer."8
As to game on the land, it is clear that what Blackstone calls a
"qualified property" is merely the right which the owner of the
land has to take such game found thereon, and to prevent other
from doing so, for Blackstone says, "he may have the privilege of
hunting, taking and killing them in exclusion of other persons,"
and then concludes from this that, "he has a transient property in
these animals usually called game, so long as they continue within
his liberty, and may restrain any stranger from taking them therein; but the instant they depart into another liberty, this qualified
property ceases."
The term "qualified property" is therefore
misleading as used above, since all that Blackstone meant here was
that the landowner has the exclusive right to take game on his
land, but it does not follow from this, as Blackstone seemed to be,
lieve, that he has a "qualified property" or in fact any propertywhatever in any particular animal which might happen to be on.
his land. If a man has any property in a wild rabbit on his landT
then we may have the curious situation of this property shifting
from one man to another many times in a single day without the
knowledge of any of the persons concerned. It may also be assumed that the term "qualified property" which Blackstone uses
in respect to water and air likewise means only the exclusive right
the landowner has on his own land, to appropriate and use these
things, a right which is a property right in itself, but does not give
any property in either water or air.7 The one common characteristic of all these things in which Blackstone says there is a "quali.
62

BLACK. Commn., 395.
7 This is made clearer by the quotation in note 4, supra, and by his discussion

of title
by occupancy. See 2 BLACK. CoMm., 400 et. scq. This statement of Blackstone, as hereafter stated, Is probably responsible for the qualified property theory
as to oil and gas. See the leading case of Westmoreland Gas Co. -u. DeWitt, 130
Pa. St. 235, 18 At. 724 (1989).
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fled property" is that, "these are of a vague and fugitive nature
and therefore can admit only of a precarious and qualified ownership, which lasts so long as they are in actual use and occupation
and no longer." It is submitted that this is a fundamental difference, which, on principle, makes the rule of Coke inapplicable to
things of a "vague and fugitive nature", that is, to all those things
found either above or beneath the surface of the earth which possess this common characteristic-things which are capable of passing from one tract of land to another tract of land without the
volition of the owner of the former tract. There are therefore
three great classes of things: First, there are things which are
fixed and immovable, such as the solid parts of the earth and the
space above it and the space containing the solids; second, there
are the chattels which may be moved by man or, like domestic animals, which have the power of motion, but are within the possession
and control of some owner; third, there are things which in the
state of nature are controlled by no one and in the possession of no
one, and are not fixed and immovable, but which possess the power
of moving from place to place on the surface of the earth or beneath
the surface, without the volition of any surface owner. This third
class on principle cannot be the property of any person or group of
persons until appropriated. We have certain rules of law which
-apply to chattels and materially different rules which we apply to
immovable things, but we do not yet have a distinct set of rules to
govern the third class though the substances within it are fundamentally different from those within either of the other classes, in
that they are not property of any one, though individuals may have
the right to appropriate them and this right is property. Instead,
most of the courts have tried to treat some substances belonging to
this third class as the property of individuals and to apply to these
substances the same principles which they apply to immovable portions of the earth.
'On principle this class, of fugitive things ought to be treated
differently from the other classes. No one has any actual possession or control over them and consequently no landowner is
liable if they pass to other land and do damage there. No one has
title to any land of which they are a fixed and immovable part
until detached by the owner, as in the case of solid minerals. Our
property law has been built up on these other classes of things as
to which title of an owner remains in him until dislodged in cer-
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tain well settled modes. That this third class of things does not
constitute personal property until reduced to the possession or
control of someone is everywhere well settled, but the rules which
apply to title to real property are also inapplicable because these
things do not remain fixed but move from place to place. So far
we have no established conception of a sort of title to property
'which shifts from one man to another merely because the property
-changes its location. Consequently, as heretofore stated, on prin-ciple no one should have any property in these substances until appropriated.
Among the things above the surface which possess this characteristic of moving from place to place are air, flowing water, fish and
game. Among the things beneath the surface which possess this
Tommon characteristic are percolating waters and oil and gas.
-Other valuable things possessing this common characteristic may
possibly be discovered in the future. Any of these things may be
reduced to possession by man, and when so reduced to possession
-may become valuable personal property. As has been stated here-tofore, it was very early recognized that Coke's rule could not be
successfully applied to air, flowing water, game and fish, without
making serious modifications in the established theories of title to
real property. These things were not controlled by any one and
they would -not stay in one place. Hence if they passed from A's
land to that of B and B appropriated them, A could not well be
permitted to bring trover, nor could B be permitted to sue A for
failure to keep his property off of B's land. They clearly were not
-chattels until actually reduced to possession and if they were
realty, then there was the difficulty that if the property in them
were held to be in the owner of the land where they were temporarily found, it necessarily would be lost when these substances
passed to other land. There would thus result the strange specta-de of A's real estate moving around over other real property.
Think of applying the principles of lateral and subjacent support
to such substances!
Do oil and gas properly belong within this class of fugitive
things? It is submitted that they do.8 They are found under great

8 In the first of a valuable series of articles on "The Law of
.MICH. L. REv. 445, Mr. James A. Veasey has pointed out that
'fixed locus in the land before there is production and that the
various courts that these are minerals which migrate from one
erroneous.

This Is undoubtedly true and it would be well if

-to deal with the law of oil and gas could read this article.
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pressure in porous strata of sand or rock. and while they undoubtedly stay in place for very long periods, yet if the reservoir con-.
tailing them is tapped by a well, and the pressure reduced at that.
point, they do flow towards that point of reduced pressure. Gaa
flows more readily than oil which is a heavy liquid, but certainlyoil does flow from considerable distances though the flow may be.
slow. Oil wells often prove to be gushers and on account of the.
tremendous pressure below continue to flow for a considerable period and then may be pumped for a longer period, so the supply
must come from surrounding areas. It is universally admitted that
a landowner is able to drain oil and, to a greater extent, gas from.
his neighbor's land. The value of these minerals is so great that
even a relatively small drainage means a great loss in value to the,
land drained. Therefore these minerals do possess the common.
characteristic in so great a degree as to make it logically impossible to bring them under Coke's rule of absolute ownership.
The law as to these various things of a fugitive nature varies.
As to air and flowing water it is well settled that the landowner,
has no actual title but that he has a right to reduce them to possession and of course this includes a right to use them without
actual reduction to possession.9 This right to reduce to possession.
is not an absolute right. Thus the landowner may take water from
a stream to any extent for domestic use, and he may make a more
limited use of the water for various other purposes, but he is not.
permitted to pollute the stream to an unreasonable degree nor reduce the volume of water unreasonably. 10 Likewise as to air he
may take an unlimited quantity because the supply so far has:
proved unlimited, but he may not pollute the air unreasonably to.
the detriment of his neighbors." Why? Because both the water
and the air are constantly passing over land belonging to different
owners, each of whom has like rights and privileges of enjoyment
and therefore the rights of each owner are limited by consideration
for the rights of the others. Each may make a reasonable use of
that drainage may occur to a greater or lesser extent. There ean be no doubt that
large quantities of both oil and gas can be drained.
In many sections one gas,

well on forty acres seems to be considered sufficient to exhaust the gas beneatbt

the land and one oil well on each ten acres Is considered sufficient to exhaust the oil..
If this is the case, the character of these minerals would seem to be established.
- see 2 BLACK. Comm., 18, 19, 394. As to water, see TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY,
2 ed., 1131; FARNHAM, WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS, § 462. That the landowner
has no property in air or in flowing waters seems to be established.
MoSee TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2 ed., 1130-1148; FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, §§ 462-67; GOULD, WATEns, § 204.
11 For a collection of cases on pollution of the air, see TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY,
2 ed., 338.
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the air or the flowing water. What is a reasonable use depends
on many circumstances including the character of the thing taken
and its relation to the land and the enjoyment thereof. As said
above, a man may take all the air he pleases because the supply is
adequate and the rights of others are thereby not damaged, but
as soon as he unreasonably pollutes the air he may interfere with
the rights of others; but he may not take an unlimited amount of
flowing water because the supply is not adequate for all purposes.
It has always been understood that underground streams are to be
treated like surface streams in this respect. Whether such socalled streams are distinguishable from percolating waters may
well be questioned. Undoubtedly real streams of this sort are very
rare. At any rate it is settled that the water in underground
streams is one kind of substance beneath the surface which it is
settled the landowner does not own."
As to percolating waters it would seem that on principle the
same general rule ought to apply that is applied to air, to water"
in surface streams and to water in subterranean streams, that is,
that each landowner has a right to take such waters and make a
reasonable use of the same but that prior to reduction to possession
the landowner has no property in any of the water. Certainly
there can be no valid distinction between water in an underground
stream and percolating waters. Until the middle of the past century it was apparently considered that the landowner owned
everything beneath the surface of his land, consequently when the
first cases arose involving percolating waters, the courts were predisposed in favor of the absolute ownership rule, and this rule has
been regarded as established in England.'3 Being unsound on
principle, there arose difficulty in applying this absolute ownership rule logically. If one owns certain percolating water absolutely, he should have a right to pollute it if he so desires yet if
this were permitted it might seriously damage the enjoyment of
land by neighboring landowners. The landowner does not have
control of the water and could not possibly keep this water which
he theoretically owned within his own land, yet he is not liable
12 See FARNHAU, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 944; GOULD, WATERS, § 281;
TIrPANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2 ed., § 342; 19 L. R. A. 97n. It is usually said that
the law as to underground streams is the same as that governing surface streams.
While this statement is too broad, yet the law is the same in so far as the landowner's property rights in the water in such streams are concerned.
11 Chasemere v. Richards, 7 H. L. C. 349 (1859) ; Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. &
W. 324 (1843).
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for any damages which this water does to adjoining land after it
escapes if he does not pollute it. If he should color it in order to
see whether his neighbor was converting the water and found the
colored water in the tank by his neighbor's well, damages ought to
be allowed. Yet, even the English courts seem disposed to allow
the neighbor to recover damages although the one these courts say
owned the water, colored it for the purpose of proving that the
neighbor was converting it. 14 This merely indicates some of the
difficulties in applying an absolute ownership rule of law to a
thing of fugitive nature which will not stay in place, but which
noves about without any landowner being able to control it. The
difficulty in applying the absolute ownership theory has led to a
departure from this theory in this country in some jurisdictions."
though others still purport to apply the absolute ownership theory.
But few of the courts so far have ventured to assert that the landowner has no property in the water at all. Usually they have resorted to Blackstone's "qualified property" theory just as in the
vase of wild animals. One of the earliest and best reasoned cases
denying the absolute property theory as to percolating waters is
Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing Company,5 in which the court
said:
"If this doctrine of absolute ownership is not well founded
in legal principles, certainly there is nothing in its practical
operation that so commends it to our approval as to lead to its
adoption. It must, if held as in several cases, leave everywhere
a conflict of right and enjoyment, irreconcilable in law and in
fact; and, however held, it will, in a variety of cases, lead to
incalculable mischiefs. Logically followed out this doctrine,
if confined to water naturally in or upon the land, would forbid almost all interference by each landowner with his own
14Ballard v. Tomlinson, L. R. 29 Ch. Div. 115 (1885) ; Hodgkinson V. Enner, 4
Best & S, 229 (1863).
See Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. St. 143,
1 Atl. 1012 (1890) ; Bali v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868).
See also FIARNEAW,
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 945, for additional cases.
In this section the
learned author says: "Some courts are very willing to assert that a landowner
may maliciously deprive his neighbor of a water supply by pumping or draining it
away, but at the same time they assert that he cannot effect such deprivation by
polluting the source of the supply. It could not for a moment be conceded that
there was a right to pollute the water, and that the fact that there is no such right
shows that the rights with respect to percolating waters are not absolute, but correlative, and that each landowner must, in using his property, see that he does
not injure his neighbor."
25 Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 663 (1902) ; Erickson v. Crookston
Water Works Co., 100 Minn. 481, 111 N. W. 391 (1907), s. c. 105 Minn.
182. 117 N. W. 435 (1908) ; Meeker v. East Orange, 77 N. J. L. 623, 74 A. 379
(1909) ; Forbell v. New York, 164 N. Y. 522, 58 N. E. 644 (1900)
Hathorn t.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 194 N. Y. 326, 87 N. E. 504 (1909) ; Pence v. Carney,
U8 W. Va. 296, 52 S. E. 702 (1905).
-S 43 N. H. 569, 575 (1862).
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land; or if applied to all the waters found in or upon the land
not gathered into natural watercourses, would take away all
remedy for malicious acts in relation to them."
The argument of this court is difficult to answer. Courts which
adopt the absolute property theory in fact do make exceptions in
many cases. If the absolute property theory must lead to injustice or to a lot of inconsistent exceptions, it ought to be discarded.
The cases in which it has been said the landowner owns the percolating waters have usually been cases where he asserted the right
to drain his neighbor's supply by intercepting the waters on his
own land. But no court has followed out this theory to its logical
conclusion. An examination of the authorities will convince one
that not only is the law unsettled oh this point, but a grave doubt
will arise as to whether in any jurisdiction the absolute ownership
theory prevails.17 Certain it is that the thory that each landowner
may make only a reasonable use of percolating waters has been
gaining in favor.
Coming now to the right of the landowner to oil and gas in
place, we find the law in great confusion. There are three theories
as to the right of the landowner in the oil and gas in place, all of
which have been suggested by various courts in the eases involving
percolating waters.
1. That the landowner owns the oil and gas beneath the surface of his land absolutely just as he owns solid minerals. This
for convenience will hereafter be called the absolute property
theory.
2. That the landowner has title to the oil and gas while they
are beneath his land, but loses such title if they pass beneath the
surface to the land of another. It follows that the latter gains
title just as soon as they come within his boundaries. This will
hereafter be called the qualified property theory.
17 In FARNHAm, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 938, the learned author after
fully discussing the problem concludes:
"in view of the fact there are no binding
precedents in

the English

law, what is

the rule which

should

govern the subject

of percolating waters? The law governing water requires it to seek its lowest
level, so that in case the surface of a basin filled with saturated earth is opened
by several different persons, the one who sinks a pump to the lowest point may
exhaust all the water, drawing it from beneath the land of the others, although

they have an equal right to the enjoyment of the common mass. In all cases
where there is a community ownership of, or common right to, the enjoyment of
a natural product, the rule is that one of the joint owners can make only a reasonable use of his interest so as not unnecessarily or unreasonably to injure or
This rule should apply to the subject
destroy the equal rights of the co-owners.
of water from a saturated stratum extending under the property of several owners.
And this is the rule which has been applied by the great weight of authority."
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3. That the landowner does not have title to the oil and gas in
place beneath his land, but within his own boundaries he has the
exclusive right to reduce these minerals to his possession. This
will hereafter be called the no-property theory.
Each of these theories is supported by a considerable body of
authority. 18 It will be noted that the first theory is similar to.theabsolute property theory which is applied to percolating waters in,
England and in some jurisdictions in this country. The qualified
property theory is much like the doctrine stated in many of the
cases involving the rights of a landowner in wild animals on his
land, and in many of the cases in this country which hold landowners have correlative rights in percolating waters. The noproperty theory closely resembles the theory applied to air, snd to
surface and underground streams. Each of these theories will be
discussed briefly.
The absolute property theory assumes that the landowner owns
the oil and gas in place just as he owns the coal or other solid minerals while in place. The objections to this theory have already
been suggested in the discussion of percolating waters. If A has
absolute title to the oil and gas beneath his land and B sinks wells
near the boundary and begins to draw part of these minerals from
A's land, since he is taking A's oil and gas he ought to be liable to
A for damages for conversion. In a paper read before the Texas
Bar Association last summer 1 9 in which the absolute property
theory was supported as being sound on principle, this difficulty
was met by stating that A does not lose title to the oil and gas
"s Time and space will not permit an extended discussion of the numerous cases.
Discussions of the leading cases supporting these theories will be found in the following articles:
"The Right of a Landowner to the Oil and Gas in His Land,"
63 PA. L. REV. 471; "Property In Oil and Gas," 29 YALE L. J. 174; "The Law of
Oil and Gas," 18 MICH. L. REV. 445, 652; "The Struggle of the Oil Industry for
the Sanctity of its Basic Contract: The Oil and Gas Lease," to be published in the
REPoRT OF THE TEXAS BAR ASSOCIATION, 1920.
19 This paper was by Mr. James A. Veasey of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and will be
published in the REPORT OF THE TEXAS BAR AssOcIATION for 1920.
This report
is apparently not yet published.
This paper and the articles by the same author
now running in the MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW are the most interesting and valuable
which have so far been published on this subject.
Since they are written by a
lawyer with long experience in oil and gas litigation they are entitled to great
'weight.
The learned author strongly favors the absolute property theory whereas
the authors of previous articles have all favored the no-property theory as being
correct on principle.
It is interesting to note that while the learned author insists the weight of authority favors the absolute ownership theory he says that
these courts which have decided that the landowner owns the minerals absolutely confined their decisions to the oil and gas actually In place at the time of
the inquiry into its ownership and that "This concept does not Include the oil or
gas which has departed from the land, and it ignores the possible escape of a
portion of the oil or gas in the future. The subject matter dealt with is the oil
and gas in place at the moment of inquiry into its ownership."
If this is true
then West Virginia must be ruled ot
of the absolute ownership jurisdictions.
See
cases cited In note 24. See also TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2 ed., § 256; GOULD,
WA ERS, § 291.
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thus drained from his land by B, but that A's predicament is due
to his inability to prove title to the oil or gas taken from his land
by B. 20 To this suggestion we may answer, first, that it seems to
have no support in the decisions, second, that the court ought not
deny A a remedy merely because his damages are difficult to prove
with any great degree of precision, and, third, that since the remedy at law is manifestly inadequate and the damages to his land
will be irreparable a court of equity at the suit of A ought to restrain B from further drainage of these minerals from A's land.
In regard to the second objection in one case where the suit was
brought by an oil and gas lessor against his lessee, for breach of
the lessee's implied covenant to protect the leasehold from drainage, the damages were based on the value of the oil so lost by the
lessor.21 In this case the court did instruct the jury to find from
the evidence the amount of oil lost by drainage and allowed damages based on the same. In other cases where the suit was for
breach of express or implied covenant of the lessee to develop the
leasehold diligently the damages allowed were based on the amount
of oil the lessee would have produced had he performed his covenant, a matter which is as difficult to prove as the amount of oil
lost by drainage. 22 No court has denied an action for breach of
covenant on this ground though the difficulty in proving damages
is just as great. It is submitted that the very fact that it
is necessary to resort to the suggestion that the difficulty is
merely one of proof, is a strong argument against the soundness of the absolute property theory. But this suggestion
does not explain why A should not be able to secure an injunction against B though certainly no court would seriously
The absolute property
consider granting such 4 remedy.
theory is supported by the courts of West Virginia, Kansas
and Texas, 23 but in the two former states the decisions were
in cases which involved grants or reservations of oil and gas in

0The
for 1920

page cannot be given because the REPORT OP THE TEXAs BAR ASSoCTATIOh
Is not yet

available.

a Kleppner v. Lemon, 197 Pa. St. 430, 47 Atl. 353 (1900) ; on rehearing, 198
See also cases collected in L. R. A. 1917E 981.
Pa. St. 581. 48 AtI. 483 (1901).
=-Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 151 Ill. App. 102 (1909) and 181 Ill. App. 135
(1913) ; affirmed. 263 Ill. 518, 105 N. E. 308 (1914) ; Bradford Oil Co. V. Blair, 113
Pa. St. 83. 4 Atl. 218 (1886); Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Jeff Chaison Townsite Co.,
48 Tex. Civ. App. 555, 107 S. W. 609 (1908), reversed on appeal without consideration of this point. See also note in 25 W. VA. L. QutAR. 73.
= Moore v. Griffin, 72 Kan. 164, 83 Pac. 395 (1905) ; Mound City Brick & Gas
Co. v. Goodspeed Gas & Oil Co., 83 Kan. 136, 109 Pac. 1002 (1910) ; Texas Co. V.
Daugherty, 176 S W. 717 (1915); Williamson u. Jones, 39 .W. Va. 231, 10 S. E.
436 (1894): Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. E. 781 (1897); Preston p.
White, 57 W. Va. 278, 50 S. E. 236 (1905).
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place and in these cases simply followed the rule of law applicable to grants or reservations of solid minerals. But it seems
that none of these courts recognize the right of one landowner to
any remedy against another for drainage, thus refusing to carry
out the theory to a logical conclusion in the very case where it
would be of value to the landowner.2 4 If A cannot sue B for
draining the oil from A's land, then it must follow that A loses
his title in the oil or gas and that B gains title when the mineral
crosses the boundary line unless we adopt the above suggestion
that A's difficulty is merely one of proof, but this difficulty of
proof ought to aid A in securing a remedy in equity. If title is
thus lost when the mineral crosses the boundary, then the absolute property theory becomes nothing more than the qualified
property theory. 2 It is submitted there is no jurisdiction which
follows the absolute property theory.
The qualified property rule was stated in a leading case on the
point as follows:
"They (oil and gas) belong to the owner of the land, and
are a part of it, so long as they are on it or in it, and are subject to his control; but when they escape, and go into otherland, or come under another's control, the title of the former
owner is gone." 26
This language, or variations of it, often with considerable changes
in the wording, has been quoted in subsequent cases over and over
again, together with a bewildering lot of other statements more or
less inconsistent with it. However, the above statement has become so near a classic that it sometimes seems that a court feels
an opinion on the question cannot be complete without repeatingit. Furthermore, the statement is found quoted with apparent approval not only by courts which have adopted the absolute property
2

Ohio Fuel Oil Co. v. Burdett, 72 W.

Va. 803, 79 S. E.

South Penn Oil Co., 76 W. Va. 768, 86 S. E. 880 (1915).

667

(1913) ; Gain V.

In the two cases citedt

in note 25 the Kansas court approved the qualified property theory.
^ It is interesting to note that in West Virginia, one of the states which asserts the absolute property theory in cases arising between grantor and grantee
of the oil and gas in fee or between tenants In common and life tenants and remaindermen, the court has emphatically declared in the cases in note 24, supra, that.
an adjoining landowner has no remedy for drainage. Also in Howerton V. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 82 Kan. 367, 108 Pac. 813 (1910), a suit in which damages were allowed a lessor for failure of his lessee to drill offset wells to prevent drainage,

the court approved the qualified property theory.

These cases indicate that even

West Virginia and Kansas have repudiated the absolute property theory.

Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Freeman, 68 Kan. 691, 75 Pac. 995 (1904).
20 Westmoreland Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. St. 235, 249, 18 AI.
(1889).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol27/iss4/2

See also,

724, 725

12

Simonton: Has a Landowner Any Property in Oil and Gas in Place
HAS A LANDOWNE.B

ANY PROPERTY IN OIL AND GAS?

293

theory, but also by those which have adopted the no-property
theory.
It is probable that this term "qualified property" was suggested
by Blackstone and subsequent text writers, and by the language
used in the cases relating to wild animals. In the case last mentioned the court applied the analogy of water and wild animals,
saying:
"Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed
by themselves, if the analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals
ferae naturae. In common with animals, and unlike other
minerals, they have the power and tendency to escape without
'27
the volition of the owner."
The court evidently considered the landowner the qualified
owner of wild animals on his land, and applied to oil and gas its
notion of the law as to wild animals. As has been above pointed
out the idea that a landowner has a qualified property in the animals on his land is unsound, though this term "qualified property" has been apparently approved by the courts from time to
time, probably by reason of the misleading statement in Blackstone above quoted. It has always been the opinion of the writer
that this accounts for the qualified property theory-that it was
established on analogy to the law as to wild animals and percolating waters by courts which understood the law to be that the landowner had a qualified title to wild animals on his land and to percolating waters beneath his land.
The objection to the qualified property theory is that if taken
literally, it establishes unnecessarily a species of property to which
a man loses title whenever the thing in question passes to other
land, though it is without his volition and against his desire and
consent. The learned writer of the paper read before the Texas
Bar Association said: "There is no place in our jurisprudence
for this species of legerdemain. " 28 This is certainly true if the
rule is taken literally, for there is no necessity for establishing
such new species of property. Be that as it may, the theory has
undoubtedly been announced in many more cases than either of
the other theories and is generally regarded as representing the
27 See note 26, supra, at the same pages.

20 See note 20, supra.
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weight of authority. 9 It is submitted, however, that the law cannot be regarded as thus settled even in the jurisdictions which have
approved the qualified property theory. Furthermore, there is
great doubt whether these courts which seem to have adopted this
theory mean more than that the landowner has the right to take
these minerals and for this reason is regarded as having some kind
of qualified property in the minerals in question-whether they
mean any more by the term "qualified property" than did Black-stone.
The no-property theory is supported in Indiana, Kentucky
and Oklahoma30 and is followed consistently by the Supreme Court
of the United States.-' The leading case adopting the theory is
Oki4 Oil Co. v. Indiana,32 which was a case involving the constitutionality of an Indiana statute prohibiting the waste of natural
gas under certain circumstances. This case is one of the class of
eases sometimes known as "Conservation Cases". It is the writer's
opinion that the court would have reached the same conclusion
and would have upheld the validity of the statute in question regardless as to whether the absolute property theory or the noproperty theory was held to be the law in Indiana. If the landowner had absolute title to the gas, then for the state to prohibit
haim from wasting it would be an interference with his use of hia
own property. If we say he had no title to the gas in question
-but only an incorporeal right to take it from him own land, then
since this right is property the effect of the statute would like-wise be to interfere with his use of his own property. The prop-erty in question would merely differ in character under the two
theories. Under the one theory there would be interference with
the owner's use of his gas and under the other theory an interference with his exercise of his right to take gas from his land.33 The
,constitutional objection would be the same in either case. The
question involved in the case was the power of the state to conserve this natural resource and it would be immaterial whether
the resource in question was solid, liquid or gaseous. The waste
2 Many cases are collected in THORNTON, THE LAw or OIL AND GAS, §§ 20-24.

w Lindley v. Raydure, 239 Fed. 928 (Ky. 1917). affirmed, 249 Fed. 675 (1918)
"Townsend v. State, 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. 19 (1897) ; State v. Ohio Ol Co., 150
Ind.
"'1,
435,
2L

21, 49 N. E. 809 (1898) ; Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky.
77 W. 368 (1903): Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 132 Ky.
111 S. W. 374 (1908); Rich v. Doneghey, 177 Pac. 86 (Okla. 1918).
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 (1900) ; Walls v. Midland Carbon Co.,

41 Sup. Ct Rep. 118 (1920).
2 See note 31, supra.
-n See note by Professor Hardman in 27 W. VA. IU QUAn. 255.
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of forests might be prohibited by the state wVith just as much rea.
son as waste of gas or oil. The day may even come when it will
be necessary for the state to say to a man "You may dig the coal
from your land and use it or sell it, or you may leave it in place,
but, if you dig it, you must not waste it." The court in Ohso Oil
Co. v. Indiana did discuss at length what interest a landowner has
in the gas in place under the law of Indiana. In the couse of
the decision the court pointed out a marked difference between
wild animals on one hand, alid oil and gas on the other, namely,
that the state has power to prohibit the taking of wild animals
while it has no such power over oil and gas. The state's power
over wild animals is of historical origin. This historical distinction does not, as has been supposed, greatly weaken the analogy
between wild animals and oil and gas in place. 34 The fundamental
likeness that both are fugitive in nature is still present. As to the
absolute property theory, the court said: "But it cannot be that
property as to a specified thing vests in one who has no right to
prevent any other person from taking or destroying the object
3' 5
It
which is asserted to be the subject of the right or property."
has
sub.
It
theory.
then proceeded to approve the no-property
sequently applied the same theory to mineral waters" and has
recently again applied it to gas. 7
In Oltio Oil Co. v. Indiana the court stated that oil and gas are
contained in a reservoir of limited extent and that all the land
above the reservoir is privately owned, and it seems to conclude
therefrom that these common owners have some sort of collective
right or property in the oil and gas in place, for it said:
"On the other hand, as to gas and oil, the surface proprietors
within the gas field all have the right to reduce to possession
the gas and oil beneath. They could not be absolutely deprived
of this right which belongs to them, without a taking of private
property. But there is a co-equal right in them all to take
from a common source of supply, the two substances which
in the nature of things are united, though separate. It follows from the essence of their right and from the situation of
On principle the state has no property in the wild animals within it, though
it does have the power to prohibit the killing or taking of such animals within its
border. The state has no title to oil or gas in place under private land but it does
not have any similar historical power to prohibit the landowners from taking oil
and gas from their land.
= See p. 201.
= See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U .S. 61 (1911).
3T Walls V. Midland Carbon Co., svpra
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things, as to which it can be exerted, that the use by one of his
power to seek to convert a part of the common fund to actual
possession may result in an undue proportion being attributed
to one of the possessors of the right, to the detriment of the
others or by waste by one or more, to the annihilation of the
rights of the remainder. Hence it is that the legislative power,
from the peculiar nature of the right and the objects upon
which it is to be exerted, can be manifested for the purpose of
protecting all the collective owners, by securing a just distribution, to arise from the enjoyment by them, of their privilege to reduce to possession, and to reach the like end by preventing waste. "38
it is submitted that this is unsound and that there can be no such
collective ownership in the oil and gas in place. The difficulty in
applying such a theory is as great as the difficulty in applying the
qualified property theory. In fact this seems to be the qualified
property theory in a modified form. The theory of the court apparently is that, since a limited number of persons have the right
to tap this particular reservoir, these owners must in some way
collectively own the contents. There is certainly no necessity for
reaching such a conclusion. If the landowners are collective owners of the oil and gas in the reservoir then they ought to have the
right to make joint claims of some sort to the product of the reservoir. But it is settled both by custom and by law that one landowner has the right to take all the oil and gas he can secure 9
The state may prohibit waste of the minerals 0 and perhaps an
adjoining landowner could enjoin malicious waste.4' Whether the
adjoining owner can enjoin non-malicious waste is still an open
question,4 2 but if the landowner cannot exercise his right to take
oil and gas with reasonable regard for the rights of his neighbors
then an injunction ought to be allowed for non-malicious waste.
In one state the validity of a statute prohibiting the pumping of
31See

pp. 209-10.
89 Brown v. Spillman, 155 U. S. 665 (1895) ; Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. V,. Guaranty
Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919); Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Oh. St. 317.
49 N. B. 399 (1898) ; Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. St. 379, 44 AtI. 1074 (1900) .
Barnard v. Monongahela Gas Co., 216 Pa. St. 362, 65 At!. 801 (1906); Ohio Fuel
Oil Co. V. Burdett, 72 W. Va. 803, 79 S. E. 667 (1913) ; Gain v. S6uth Penix
Oil Co., 76 W. Va. 768, 86 S. U. 80 (1915).
It is submitted that the numerous cases .holding that the lessor can sue the
lessee for damages for failure to protect the leasehold from drainage, or may In
such case forfeit the lease for breach of implied condition also support this statement. For a collection of such cages see L. R. A. 1917E, 981 and L. R. A. 1915B,
561.
" Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 (1900); Walls v;.Midland Carbon Co.,
41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118 (1920).
,a See Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., supra.
42 See Manufacturers' Oil & Gas Co. v. Indiana Gas & Oil Co., 155 Ind. 461.
57 N. U. 912 (1900).
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gas wells was sustained and the court stated that an injunction
might have been granted on common law principles in the absence
of statute.43 But these cases were apparently based on the assumption that the pumping of gas wells would have the effect of
destroying the wells on neighboring lands before the gas was exhausted from such lands. Aside from these cases there seems at
present no authority to the effect that the pumping of gas wells
can be enjoined by an adjoining landowner where the only effect
thereof is to exhaust the gas in the reservoir sooner than would
otherwise have been the case, though the idea that such an injunc4
tion might be had seems prevalent among writers on the subject. '
If the landowner does not have any title to the oil and gas in place
beneath his land, then all the right he has is the incorporeal right
to take oil and gas within his boundaries. This right is limited in
that he can be prohibited by statute from needlessly wasting the
minerals, and where his acts are malicious he may be enjoined by
a court of equity at the suit of a neighbor. Perhaps he is further
limited in that he may be restrained from pumping gas if the effect is to damage his neighbors' right in any way except by the exhaustion of the gas. The only uses of oil and gas are the ordinary
commercial uses therefore it is reasonable to allow each landowner
to take all he can secure so long as the only effect is to exhaust the
available supply. Any other rule would seriously interfere with
the production of oil and gas. Thus oil and gas differ from perpercolating waters and flowing waters, both of which have other
important values to the land aside from, and usually more
important than, their purely commercial value. These waters
are essential to the fertility of the land, and to its use for
either residential purposes or business purposes. Land is not
damaged by the exhaustion of the oil and gas otherwise
than by its reduction in value by reason of the fact that
Consethese minerals can no longer be obtained from it.
be
well
might
gas
oil
and
of
the
case
in
is
reasonable
what
quently
courts
the
so
far,
that
unreasonable as to water. It is submitted
as to oil and gas have in effect applied the doctrine that the landowner must exercise his right to take oil and gas reasonably with
due respect to the rights of his neighbors. He does not own the
43 Manufacturers' Oil & Gas Co. v. Indiana Gas & Oil Co., supra; also case of
the same name, 156 Ind. 579, 59 N. E. 169 (1901).
" See note in 27 W. VA. L. QUAR. 74.
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oil and gas. Neither do the adjoining landowners. He does own
the land and may take these more or less fugitive minerals and his
neighbors have no right to complain but if he needlessly wastes
them, then they do have a right to complain.
It is evident this incorporeal right to take oil and gas from the
land is a valuable thing under this no-property theory. Is there
any difficulty in conveying this right separately and apart from
the land? None whatever. Practically all courts are agreed that
the so-called oil and gas lease gives only an incorporeal right in the
land to the lessee. 45 No difficulty has been encountered in enforcing such leases and in protecting the rights of the parties thereto
in every particular. If we can have an incorporeal right to take
oil and gas so long as they can be produced in paying quantities,
there would seem to be no good reason why we can not have such
a right conveyed in fee simple. It would only amount to a profit
in fee simple instead of a profit for less than a fee simple. Fee
simple profits in coal are common and other forms of incorporeal
fee simple rights may be created, so evidently this one could. The
courts in Indiana and Kentucky where the no-property theory is
established have apparently had no more difficulty respecting conveyances of oil and gas or in regard to leases of oil and gas than
the other states. It is possible in these states to convey this right
in fee.4' Does any one suppose that a grant of oil and gas in place
in these states is less valuable because the grantee gets merely the
incorporeal right to take the oil and gas instead of the absolute
title to the oil and gas in place ? One thing is exactly as valuable
as the other because no court has ever allowed a landowner a remedy at law or in equity for drainage. He gets in either case in effect no more than the right-to take all the oil and gas he can procure from the land and it becomes his oil and gas when reduced to
possession. The grantee cannot procure more oil and gas or more
valuable oil or gas merely because the courts of the state in which
the land is located hold he owns the oil and gas in place. The privilege, of taking the oil and gas is all any one desires. If the
grantee gets only an incorporeal right to take oil and gas and
makes a lease he gives his lessee just as complete and valuable a
" See cspes cited in 18 MICH. L, Rav. 786 et seq.; also cases cited in 25 W. VA.
L. QuAn. 295.
" See Ieller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N. E. 490 (1902) : Richmond Natural Gas

Co. v.

Davenport, 38 Tnd. Anp. 27, 76 N.

E. 524

(1905) ; McKinney V.

Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 134 Ky. 230, 120 S. W. 314 (1909); Barker
v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 176 Pac. 468 (Okla. 1918).
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right as the oil and gas lessee acquires in West Virginia or Kansas
or Texas where the courts say the landowner owns the oil and
gas absolutely.
It has been suggested in the article heretofore mentioned that the
courts will regard such. an incorporeal right as being something of
little dignity and will therefore not protect it properly.4 7 But is
this true? Has it proved true in states where the no-property
theory has been adopted? It is submitted it has not. Furthermore, it is submitted that most of the difficulties have arisen in
regard to oil and gas leases and such leases are usually held to
confer only an incorporeal right on the lessee. If there is any
merit in the practical objection to the no-property theory it would
have to be carried to the extent of radically changing the law a3
to oil and gas leases in order to reach the real field of difficulty.
In conclusion, it is submitted that on principle the landowner
ought to be held to have no property in substances of a fugitive
nature merely because they happen to be on, over or within his
land for the time being; that while he has no property in these
substances themselves while in the state of nature, he does have an
exclusive right on his own land to reduce them to his control and
thus acquire a personal property interest in the portion he has thus
brought within his control; that this right to reduce to control is
an incorporeal property right incident to the ownership of the
land but the ownership of such right may by proper conveyance
be separated from the property in the rest of the land. Among the
substances which possess this fugitive nature are waters in streams
both above and below the surface, percolating waters, air, oil and
gas. The law as to air and as to water in both surface streams and
underground streams is settled substantially in accord with the
principle above stated. There is confusion in the law as to the
landowner's rights in wild animals, percolating waters and oil
and gas but in no jurisdiction has the landowner been allowed the
absolute title in these substances for no court has held that a landowner has title to such substances after they have passed from his
land. There is no possible reason for distinguishing percolating
waters from the water in underground streams and it is difficult
,7 See notes

18 and 20, supra.

The logical

result of the no-property theory Is

that no corporeal estate in the oil and gas in place can be created either by grant
or reservation but why should this be alarming?
An incorporeal estate can be
conveyed separate and apart from the land and certainly is not a new or strange
thing. Nearly every oil and gas lease and nearly every coal lease creates an Incorporeal eqtate in land.
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to see how there can be any distinction as to oil and gas. While
there are courts which hold that the landowner has title to oil and
gas in place, the law seems to be settled that he cannot protect his
title, if they pass from his land to other land and therefore the
landowner has been thus deprived of the most important attribute
of ownership and of the only advantage he can derive from such
theory. The result is that even in these jurisdictions the landowner does not own these minerals in place, because he loses title
if they leave his land without his consent. While in some jurisdictions it has been held that the landowner has a qualified property in oil and gas in place, this theory cannot be supported on
principle and it is doubtful whether the courts in such jurisdictions mean more than that the landowner has a right on his own
land to take the minerals. A substantial body of authority has
adopted the theory that the landowner has no property in these
minerals in place but has the exclusive right to reduce them to
possession on his own land. This, it is submitted, is sound on
principle and is supported by the analogies as to water in surface and underground streams, as to air, and by a very respectable body of authority as to percolating waters and wild animals.
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